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Anaxagoras' Theory of Change;
a Response to Parmenides*
Simplicius Phys. 163.18: "In the first book of his
Physics. Anaxagoras plainly declares that coming-to-be and
perishing are coming together and coming apart. This is what
he writes:
'Coming-to-be and perishing are customarily be
lieved in incorrectly by the Greeks, since nothing comes-to-be
or perishes, but rather it is mingled together out of things
that are, and again comes apart. Thus they would be correct
to call coming-to-be being mingled together, and perishing
coming apart. " Ί
Empedocles: "When they [sc. the four roots— earth,
water, air, fire] are mingled together to form a man and so
come to light [??], or to form the race of wild beasts, or of
plants, or of birds, then men speak of 'coming-to-be'; and
when they come apart, then they speak of 'ill-fated death'.
They are not right to call them so, but I myself comply with
the customary belief."2

These two fragments plainly make the same point, apart
from the concession in Empedocles' last line. In addition,
the verbal parallels are numerous: "coming-to-be" ( γΐν&σθαι);
"mingling" ( σψ,μίσγεται, μιγεντα ); "coming apart" (Piακρίνεται ,
άποκριθωσι ); "customary belief" ( νομίξουσι, νόμος). Almost all
commentators agree that both philosophers are presenting a
similar solution to the same problem--the problem posed by the
argument of Parmenides B 8.1-21, which culminates in the con
clusion "Hence coming-to-be is extinguished, and perishing is
unintelligible."3 Both philosophers accept this conclusion,
but argue that physical change can nevertheless be described
without writing contradictions or nonsense, so long as it is
interpreted as the "mingling together" and "coming apart" of
"things that are" before, during and after the change, I
shall take this as an agreed starting point.

This paper is a revised and shortened version of a
paper entitled "Anaxagoras and the Eleatics" which I presented
to the University of Alberta's "Workshop" on the Eleatics, at
Edmonton, Alberta, in November 1974.
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The recurrence of so many of the same words in two
such short passages may suggest that one writer had read the
other before writing his version, in spite of the distance
between their home towns (something like 800 nasty sea miles),
and the figurative distance between their cultural milieus.
But let us reserve judgment about that; it is possible that
the common purpose of the two passages is sufficient to ex
plain the echoes.
Assuming, then, that Anaxagoras was responding to
Parmenides, I shall examine the nature of his response. I am
aiming to show that the fragments and other evidence can and
should be interpreted as belonging to a system whose main
purpose is to provide an apparatus for explaining change with
out "coming to be" or "perishing". The system makes one
assumption which was denied by Parmenides: that it is pos
sible and legitimate to "set up two forms in the mind for
naming" (Parmenides B 8.53).^ That is to say, when sense
perception distinguishes one thing as different in some way
from another, according to Anaxagoras as opposed to Parmenides
we can give an account of those two things, preserving their
difference and duality, without breaking any epistemological
rule. I am not sure whether Anaxagoras had, or even thought
he had, any argument against Parmenides on this point; it may
be that he simply contradicted Parmenides. Given this assump
tion, it was possible for Anaxagoras to introduce motion with
out any further assumptions (except Mind)
since Parmenides,
as it appears, had no argument against the possibility of
motion except that it is impossible to distinguish any one
thing from another at all, and therefore impossible to dis
tinguish any place from any other.
I
shall argue that we can understand Anaxagoras'
theory of matter as a reasonable development from these first
principles. Part of my motive in this paper is to argue
against those who have written that Anaxagoras was responding
not only to Parmenides, but also to Zeno.
The case for re
jecting their thesis is fairly strong, I believe, but not con
clusive. Since my interpretation of the theory of matter can
stand independently of my case for dating Zeno after Anax
agoras, I have put the arguments about Zeno into an appendix.

Perhaps I can make a start from the concept that has
caused most trouble to those who try to explain Anaxagoras:
rerum quam dicit homoiomerian, as Lucretius puts it, no doubt
surprised and happy to find that it fits into a Latin hexam
eter. The abstract noun homoiomeria is attributed to An
axagoras himself by Simplicius, Aetius, and other commentators,
and it also turns up in the plural as a concrete noun, for
which English historians use the version "homoiomeries".®
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No word of this type occurs in the fragments.
The earliest
attribution of anything comparable to Anaxagoras is in Aris
totle, who says more than once:® "Anaxagoras made the homoiomere [neuter plural adjective— the homoiomerous things] ele
ments." In one placed he explains this phrase: "for exam
ple, bone, flesh, marrow and the other things of which every
part is synonymous with the whole." This is a familiar piece
of Aristotelian terminology: he works with a three-tiered
analysis of matter, of which the first consists of the simple
bodies (earth, water, air and fire), the second the homoi
omerous bodies, and the third physical organs like arms and
hands. The criterion for distinguishing the first bodies
from the second is that the first cannot be said to be made
of the second, whereas the second are made of the first. The
criterion for distinguishing the second from the third is
that the third do not, whereas the second do, break up into
parts synonymous with the whole. Parts of a face are not face
or faces, but parts of blood and bone are blood and bone [a
difficult borderline case is suggested by the unpleasant mon
ster in the story that was made of lip]. Please observe in
passing that the second criterion does not make any distinc
tion between the first tier and the second: earth, water,
air and fire are as homoiomerous as blood and bone.
Aristotle puts a determinate list of things into this
second class. It includes animal tissues such as bone and
blood, vegetable matter such as wood and bark, and minerals
such as gold and iron.·*·®
Now, does Aristotle mean only that Anaxagoras treats
all the items on his (Aristotle’s) list as elements?·**· Or
does he mean that Anaxagoras used homoiomereity as a cri
terion in compiling his own list of elements?*-2 Does the
other evidence, with or without the support of Aristotle,
warrant our attributing some principle of homoiomereity to
Anaxagoras? If so, what part does this principle play in his
theory?
Anaxagoras asks "How does hair come into being from
what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh?"*·® I take
it, along with everyone else, that this is what the grammar
books call a "repudiating question". He means "hair could
not come into being from what is not hair." We know from the
fragment with which this paper began that there is no comingto-be in the strict sense, but only "mingling together". Hair
does not come into being; when someone's hair grows, it is
because the existing hair gets more hair added to it. The
additional hair is extracted from food, which contains hair.
This is what Lucretius says homoiomeria means in
Anaxagoras :
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"Bones grow out of tiny little bones, he says,
and out of tiny little viscera
viscera grow, and blood is made
when many drops of blood congregate together,
and he thinks gold dust can compose gold,
and earth can grow out of little earths . . . "
The same point is made in more detail by the sober Aetius,
probably following Theophrastus:
"Anaxagoras . . . declared the principles of the things
that are to be the homoiomeries. He thought it was
quite unintelligible how a thing could come into being
out of what is not or perish into what is not. Now we
take food that is simple and of one form— bread, water—
and out of it grow hair, vein, artery, flesh, nerves,
bones, etc. Since that is what happens, we have to agree
that in the food we take are all the things that are, and
that everything grows from the things that are. In that
food there are parts productive of blood, nerves, bones,
etc.--theoretical parts, because we must not refer
everything to sense perception, that bread and water pro
duce these things, but there are in them parts that are
to be distinguished in theory [ λδγςύ θεωρητά ]. So from
the fact that in food the parts are similar [μερη.,δμοια ]
to the things that are produced, he called them 'homoio—
meries' and declared that they are the principles of
things that are."15
This is a different interpretation of the term homoiomere from Aristotle's.·^ According to Aristotle's criterion,
a substance is homoiomerous if parts of it have the same name
as itself. According to the principle attributed to Anaxagoras
by Aetius, a "homoiomery" is a part of something (especially
food) that is like something else (especially biological
tissue). Breadl? is not, therefore, homoiomerous in Aris
totle's sense, at least in the present analysis. Indeed, as
Cornfdrd pointed out in his famous article, the requirement
that bread should break down into parts that are not bread
but bone, blood, flesh, etc., seems to mean that bread cannot
be homoiomerous, in Aristotle's sense. And since Anaxagoras
said "in everything there is a portion of everything",
apparently meaning this as a generalization of statements
like "there is blood, bone, flesh, etc., in bread", it appears
that nothing can be homoiomerous in Aristotle's sense.
We can get out of this bind quite easily by bringing
in a perfectly simple distinction. It is that things can be
broken down into parts in more than one way. To put it into
an Anaxagorean context, you can have ground beef (Anglice.
"mince") or digested beef. It must be possible, if the theory
is to work as an explanation of change without coming-to-be,
that substances can be broken down non-homoiomerously, like
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digested beef. But that does not mean that they cannot, on
different occasions or within different limits, be broken down
homoiomerously, like ground beef. It is perfectly obvious
that the substances which Aristotle called "homoiomere" are,
at least within limits, divisible in this way.
There is no reason why Anaxagoras should have denied
the possibility of the homoiomerous type of decomposition.
But does he need it at any crucial point in his theory of
change, and is there any evidence that he made any use of it?
I cannot see that he had any need of it. He needed—
and used--a concept that is very similar--so similar that it
is easy to understand how the tradition may have become con
fused. From B 6 we know that "everything has a share of
everything", and from B 3 that "of the small there is no least
but always a lesser". Thus any part, however small, of any
substance has all the same ingredients in it as any other part,
however large— namely, all that there are. In this sense,
then, all the parts of a substance, however small, are homoia-all alike.
Just as Aristotle's homoiomerous things break
up into ever smaller parts that have all the same character
istics as each other and the whole, so Anaxagorean substances
break up into ever smaller parts that have all the same in
gredients .
But there is an essential difference, marked by the
Anaxagorean principle "each thing is and was most evidently
those things of which there is most in it" (B 12). This is
what transforms Anaxagoras' theory into a theory of perceptible
change. When we break down a quantity of a substance into
parts, by whatever method, the parts always have all the same
ingredients as each other and as the whole; but they do not
always have them in the same proportions— and it is the pro
portions of the ingredients that determine what the thing is
"most evidently".·*·* A loaf of bread is bread, because what
it has most of in it is bread, although it also has imper
ceptible portions of blood, bone, flesh, hair and everything
else. The same is true of a slice of the loaf, and a crumb
of the slice. But when the crumb is eaten and digested, it
is mixed with the substances of the body: the bread that
preponderated in the crumb is still there, but it no longer
preponderates; the blood and bone and hair that were outweighted in the crumb join their like as they are digested,
in regions where they preponderate. In the body, bread pre
ponderates nowhere, although there is a fair amount of bread
in it--which returns to preponderance, perhaps, when the body
excretes or dies and fertilizes the ground which feeds the
wheat which makes more bread.
The point is this: there are no least parts; within
any given piece of any substance, there are smaller parts.
But there is nothing in the system that requires that below
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the level of perception the parts should all continue to be
synonymous with each other and with the whole, since although
the parts contain all the same ingredients, the preponderant
ingredients, which determine what the part is called, may
vary from part to part.^Q
So fár I have used a biological example (the diges
tion of a piece of bread), which has a special feature that
might lead to confusion. What normally alters the preponder
ance in this process is that the bread is mixed with other
substances in the body. But there are other ways of altering
the preponderance between part and part without any additions
to or subtractions from the whole with which one starts—
simply by stirring the mixture, for example. On a large
scale, this is just what happens at the beginning of Anaxag
oras' cosmogony. All sorts of ingredients in the mixture,
at first imperceptible "because of smallness" (i.e. because
they do not preponderate anywhere), are separated out by the
rotation started by mind until they do preponderate some
where.
Now, given this distinction between Aristotelian
homoiomereity, in which substances are divisible ad infinitum
into parts that are synonymous with each other and with the
whole, and an Anaxagorean principle which says that substances
are divisible ad infinitum into parts that have the same in
gredients as, but are not necessarily synonymous with, the
whole and each other, we can come back to the question about
the evidence. What evidence is there that Anaxagoras adopted
the (Aristotelian) principle of homoiomereity and made use of
it? G. B. Kerferd writes: "In fact the tradition that Anaxag
oras held the [sc. Aristotelian] principle of Homoiomereity
as part of his physical theory is just about as clear as one
could possibly ask for."21 On the contrary, I shall now have
to claim that there is no evidence whatever that Anaxagoras
held the Aristotelian principle, if there is anything in the
distinction I have drawn above.
It would be tedious to review all the evidence claimed
for their position by Kerferd and others who agree with him;
it will be enough, I hope, to indicate the lines on which I
propose to move in examining it.
Aristotle's evidence has been so thoroughly discussed
by others that there is no need add anything.22 χ believe
that all Aristotle says is that Anaxagoras made the homoiomerê
[sc. those substances that Aristotle refers to by this name]
into elements, as opposed to others, including himself, who
think they are reducible to simpler elements.
The doxographic tradition is more confused. Like
modern commentators, the doxographers were not sure whether
Aristotle’s reports meant that the Aristotelian homoiomere
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were elements for Anaxagoras, or also that these same elements
were thought of by Anaxagoras as homoiomerous. They know of
two senses in which the elements were homoiomerous: the sense
that I have analysed above (things have parts whose ingredi
ents are all the same), and another, slightly different sense,
in that things have parts which are like whatever they change
into. But to the best of my belief there is no passage in
the doxographic tradition that attributes to Anaxagoras homoiomereity of precisely the Aristotelian kind, in which all the
parts are synonymous with the whole.
There is one careful distinction to be added, however,
in support of this claim. Anaxagoras' theory of nutrition is
often described, as in the passage from Lucretius quoted above
on p.
, by saying that "bones grow out of tiny little bones",
and so on. This is reasonably
harmless. The same doctrine
is put in different terms, by saying that bones are composed of
( συνεστ&ναι and similar words) bits of bone. This is still
correct, so long as it is interpreted as a thesis in the theory
of growth. It means that things grow by the addition of por
tions of their like, which were latent in their food or their
environment. The statement that bone is made up from small
portions of bone is very like the statement that bone is
analysable into parts that are bone (i.e. Aristotelian homoiomereity) ; but the former statement is not equivalent to the
latter, does not entail the latter, and is not interpreted as
the latter by any of the doxographers, to the best of my be
lief (if I am wrong in the last clause, I shall have to claim
that the doxographer has made the same mistake as the modern
commentators).

We have taken as our starting point for explaining
Anaxagoras the principle that there is no coming to be, but
only mingling together of "things that are"; and we have seen
how this principle works in accounting for perceptible change.
When something like flesh grows, it does not come into being
out of what is not flesh; the flesh that is there already
grows by the addition of more flesh, portions of which are
latent in food. This explanation can be generalized, as we
have seen, to cover not merely growth by nutrition but other
types of natural change as well. Hence the "things that are"
include all the things that feature in natural change.
As a method of dealing with Parmenides, this theory is
generally contrasted with that of Empedocles. Guthrie's ver
sion may be taken as typical:^3
"The solution of Empedocles had been to suppose that
there was only a strictly limited number of elemental
substances which deserved to be called existent. The

8

rest, the world of 'mortal things’ which we suppose to
be real, consisted simply of mixtures of the four ’roots'
in different proportions, which could be dissolved with
out infringing the rule of 'no becoming'. The condition
laid down by Anaxagoras was stricter. On the Empedoclean
theory, if it were possible to divide a piece of (say)
flesh into small enough fragments, the elements would
come to light and it would be flesh no longer. But
Anaxagoras held that if this were even theoretically pos
sible, then a definite substance, 'flesh', could perish.
There was no reason for singling out certain forms of
matter like earth or water as primary. Why should they
be said to 'exist' more than others?"
But what about a man, or a city? If Anaxagoras' solution of
the Parmenidean deadlock is to say that the hair that grows
was in being, as hair, all the time, then are we to say that
the man that is born and grows was in being, as a man, all
the time? Somehow, because of the contrast with Empedocles,
the commentators have always stressed the enormous number of
kinds of being in Anaxagoras' system, but all of them, so far
as I have observed, tacitly put a limit on the number. They
assume, without noticing what they are omitting, that the list
of beings will include all "the natural substances", in a
sense in which a man or a horse is not a natural substance.
Aristotle noticed the point, and confirms that Anaxagoras did
indeed treat such items differently: even the Anaxagoreans,
he says, do not make a face out of faces, "nor any other of
the things that are given a shape by nature".^4
I suggest that it is at this point in Anaxagoras' sys
tem that we find a role for the "seeds" mentioned in B 4 and
by Aristotle, Theophrastus and Simplicius. We might take a
hint from the first move in the physical argument in Epicurus'
Letter to Herodotus : "Nothing comes to be out of nothing; for
everything would come to be out of everything, with no need
of seeds." At the beginning of B 4a^5 Anaxagoras says:
"These things being so, it is right to think that there are,
in all the things that are being put together, many things,
of all kinds, and seeds of all things having forms of all
kinds and colours and savours. And [sc. it is right to think
that] men were composed and the other living creatures that
have soul." And in B 4b: "Before these things were separated
off, when all things were together, no colour at all was evi
dent: for the mixture of all things prevented it--the mix
ture of the wet, the dry, the hot, the cold, the bright and
the dark, much earth being in it too,26 and seeds unlimited
in number, in no way like each other; for not even of the
other things is one like the other. These things being so,
it is right to think that all things are in the whole."
The lists in these two passages can be (and have been)
read in a number of different ways. I want to suggest that
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there is some reason for thinking of the seeds as being at a
higher level of organization than the "many things" or "the
wet, the dry" etc. In the first list, the seeds have forms
or shapes (’ιδέα: ) of all kinds, which makes us think of Aris
totle's "things that are given a shape by nature," quoted
above.27 in the second list, there seems to be some inference
a fortiori ( obôe γαρ in 35.2) from the unlikeness of the
"other things" (the wet, the cold, the dry, etc.?) to the
unlikeness of the seeds, which might suggest that the seeds
are less simple than the other things.
Anaxagoras rescues the natural substances that Aris
totle calls "homoiomerous" from coming-to-be and perishing by
supposing that they are always present but may be latent. He
cannot do quite the same for what Aristotle calls "the things
given a shape by nature", and so he comes as close to it as
he can by speaking of "seeds". In the original mixture, when
nothing was evident because of smallness, even if there were
no men, there were the seeds of men. It is likely that Anax
agoras would think of this as still satisfying the Parmenidean
requirement of no coming-to-be, since it was a common view
that the seed, in biological generation, contains all the
ingredients of the adult and grows to adulthood only by "liketo-like" addition.28
By a roundabout route I have come to the simplest of
all interpretations of the "seeds" in B 4, by finding a role
for seeds in an almost completely literal sense. The other
fragments of Anaxagoras do not mention seeds; other ancient
evidence on Anaxagoras' concept of seeds comes from a brief
passage of Aristotle, Simplicius' comment on that, and a
sentence of Theophrastus' Historia plantarum.29 Aristotle,
in an extremely well known and much discussed passage, con
trasts Anaxagoras with Empedocles, saying that whereas the
latter makes earth, water, air and fire the elements out of
which all other bodies are made, Anaxagoras takes the con
trary view and says the homoiomerous bodies are elements,
whereas air and fire are "mixtures of these and of all the
other seeds." Simplicius in his comment says "Anaxagoras
called the homoiomerous bodies, like flesh, bone, etc. 'seeds'".
Modern commentators have concluded from this evidence that
Anaxagoras spoke of seeds of flesh, bone, etc., and of the
hot, the cold, etc., and sometimes of earth, water, etc.
They may be right to think that Anaxagoras had such a general
theory of seeds, but I do not see any necessity for it in his
system, and I do not think the evidence is strong enough to
build on.
Immediately after mentioning seeds in B 4a, Anaxagoras
continues with a description of the development of a cosmos:
"These things being so . . . [it is right to think that] men
were composed, and the other living creatures that have soul.
And that by the men were built cities, and works have been
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contrived, just as they are with us, and that there is a sun
for them and a moon and the rest,, as with us, and that the
earth grows many things of all kinds for them, whose fruits
they gather into their dwellings and use. Now these things
have been said by me about the separating off, that it would
be separated off not only with us, but also elsewhere." I
agree with Frankel30 that this should not be interpreted as
implying a commitment to "other worlds"— a later doctrine.
It is something like a Gedankenexperiment. Given the initial
conditions set out at the beginning of his book, Anaxagoras
claims that it is only to be expected that things would turn
out just as we see them to have turned out. The original
mixture contained everything that now exists; it contained
the whole mass of all the material stuffs of which the world
is made, and seeds of all the structured things that exist
in the world. Given, a motive agent that can discriminate31
all these things, it is only to be expected that just such a
world will emerge as the one in which we live.
If this analysis is right, Anaxagoras’ response to
Parmenides' ban on coming-to-be is extremely simple--not at
all the subtle and complex thing it has been made out to be.
His chief tool is the concept of latency (quaedam latitandi
copia, Lucretius I 875).32 What men call "coming-to-be" is
just the coming together of what was previously latent. This
explains why it has proved so difficult to answer the ques
tion, what are the elements in Anaxagoras’ system? As he
says, there are things ( χρήματα) infinite in number (πλήθος ) ^
in the original mixture (B 1), and one cannot know the "number
of the things that are being separated off, either in theory
or in fact" (B 7). We may allow that some things are obviously
compounds, with identifiable components— for example, animals.
In those cases, the components are permanent features of the
mixture, and so is the principle of structure which is repre
sented by the seed.34 Exactly how he handled this relation
ship is a matter of guesswork. Perhaps there is flesh, bone,
blood, etc., dispersed at large and not forming the seed of
anything, while there is also flesh, bone, blood, etc. con
centrated in seeds so as to give them their character by predoiinance— concentraterd in the seeds of animals, which are
bloody, fleshy, bony, etc. Seeds should not be simply re
ducible to such components, if the apparent coming-to-be of a
man is to be explained in the standard way, avoiding offence
to Parmenides, but they must contain them. I doubt whether
earth, air, fire and water are special cases, as Aristotle
implies; that is probably a mistake.35 So if pressed with
the question, "What were the ingredients of the original mix
ture?", Anaxagoras would probably reply that the list is in
finite, but includes the hot, the cold, the wet, etc., earth,
air, ether, etc., gold, iron, flint, etc., bark, leaf, root,
flesh, blood, bone, etc., and seeds of fish, animals, men,
etc. All these are "elementary" in the sense that they are
irreducible, ungenerated and indestructible.
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Appendix
The relation between Anaxagoras and Zeno cannot be
determined with certainty, I believe. I shall argue for
three points, each of them inconclusive and together making
at best a plausible case. The first point is purely chrono
logical: there is no good external evidence for thinking
that Anaxagoras wrote later than Zeno. The second point is
that there is nothing in the wording or the content of Anax
agoras' philosophy that cannot be reasonably explained with
out the hypothesis that he was answering Zeno. The third is
that what is often said to be a response to Zeno would be
nothing but an ignoratio elenchi.
There is no need to do more than sketch the chrono
logical arguments.^ The best evidence for Zeno's date comes
from Plato, who says he was about 25 years younger than Par
menides; and the dramatic setting of the Parmenides has Par
menides about sixty-five, Zeno nearly forty, and Socrates
very young--perhaps about 450 B.C.37 Others mention a
floruit between 468 and 453.38 Plato mentions that Zeno
wrote his book when he was very young. So it seems likely
that the book was written between about 470 and 460.
According to the famous "autobiography" of Socrates
in the Phaedo. when he was young he was very much interested
in natural philosophy but was disappointed with its result
until he heard someone reading from a book by Anaxagoras
which said that Mind organized everything in the world. The
implication is that Socrates did not hear Anaxagoras in per
son. Anaxagoras is said to have come from Clazomenae to
Athens at the time of Xerxes' invasion (480) when he was
twenty— but he is also said to have begun to philosophize in
Athens under the archonship of Rallias (456). These dates
can be brought into harmony, as many editors do, by the de
vice of emending "Rallias" to "Ralliades", The latter was
archon in 480.
Guthrie‘S includes among the things that "may be said
with confidence" that Anaxagoras' book was finished later than
467, the year of the fall of the meteorite at Aegospotami.
There is a long tradition associating Anaxagoras with this
event, it is true— but the tradition says that he predicted it.
The likeliest interpretation of that legend is that it arose
from Anaxagoras' famous theory that the sun, moon and stars
are all stones: if there are heavy stones in the sky, perhaps
they will fall one day. Guthrie says "the theory was sug
gested or appeared to be confirmed by the fall of a stone
apparently from h e a v e n . it hardly needs arguing that em
pirical evidence is not a necessary precondition for Presocratic
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theories. And the story of the prediction is explained much
better if Anaxagoras’ book preceded the meteorite.^·*·
The later chronology of Anaxagoras’ life is extremely
confused.42 χ
not think there is any firm evidence that
would tend to force us to abandon the thesis that his book
was written before 467. If so, then the chronological argu
ments suggest that Zeno probably wrote after Anaxagoras.
There are two fragments of Anaxagoras that are said
to constitute a reply to Zeno;43
"For of the small there is no least but always a lesser
(for what i¿ cannot not be)--but also of the large there
is also a larger. And it is equal to the small in
πλήθος , but with respect to itself each thing is both
great and small" (B 3).
"These things having been thus separated out, it is right
to understand that all things are neither less nor more
(since it is not possible that there be more than all) ,
but all things are equal always" (B 5).
To take the second first: the allegation is that it
is a deliberate echo of Zeno B 3: "If there are many, it must
be that they are as many as they are and neither more nor less
than themselves." Zeno’s proposition, in its context, is one
half of an antinomy which aims to prove, from the premiss
"there are many", both "they are finite" and "they are in
finite". From this contradiction, Zeno wants to deduce that
the premiss "there are many" is false. Anaxagoras has no
argument against this: the most he could be doing is contra
dicting Zeno by saying that "being neither more nor less than
themselves" does not entail being finite. But the word
"always" shows that he is making quite a different point,
that the total of things does not change in time♦44 As I
have shown earlier in this paper, this proposition is needed
as part of Anaxagoras’ answer to Parmenides, and there is no
need whatever to erect a Zenonian target for him to fire at.
On the contrary, Zeno's argument in B 3 might well be
aimed at Anaxagoras. The latter shows no sign of noticing
that if things are as many as they are (which is entailed
by "all things are equal always") then they are finite. So
he asserts both "all things are equal" and "all things are
infinite". Zeno could be looking for a contradiction in
this.45
The first of Anaxagoras' fragments quoted above, B 3,
is said to be connected with the Zenonian argument against
plurality contained in B 1-2.46 The conclusion of the antin
omy in this argument is: "Thus if there are many, they must
be both large and small--small so as to have no size, large
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so as to be infinite !S
To take the second arm firsts Zeno argues that any
thing having size must be divisible into parts having size,
"to say this once is to say it always", therefore anything
having size must have an infinite number of parts having
size, and therefore it must be infinitely large. So far as
I can see, there is nothing in Anaxagoras that refers to this
argument.
As to the first arm: Zeno argues that each of the
alleged "many" must have no size, because otherwise it will
be divisible and so not be a "one". Again, there appears to
be nothing in Anaxagoras that takes note of this.
What Anaxagoras says can be wholly explained as part
of his defence of his principles of latency and predominance.
Change from A to B is possible, in his view, only if B is
latent in A. So if A is so small that it contains nothing
latent in it, it cannot change. Since he apparently wanted
to set no limits to change, he had to maintain that there is
nothing so small that it can contain nothing latent in it—
that is, "there is no least, but always a lesser". Without
this assumption, the "portions" of everything that are in
everything could be eliminated simply by taking smaller and
smaller pieces.
The theory of change depends on the proportions of
the ingredients of a thing: the possibility of change de
pends on there being a relatively large and a relatively small.
Any limits on the large and the small would limit the possi
bility of change. Hence for any given size, there must be a
"larger", if latent things can be of any size and can cease
to be latent.
When he says the large is "equal to the small in
πλήθος" he probably means that both the large and the small
contain an equal number of ingredients--namely, all that
there are. The same is said in B 6: "There are equal por
tions, in number, of the large and the small."
The last clause of B 3, "with respect to itself, each
thing is both great and small" is a little puzzling. He has
just been talking about comparative sizes— small and smaller,
large and larger. One might expect him to say that with re
spect to itself each thing is neither large nor small. I
suspect that what he means is that without comparisons a thing
is whatever you like to call it— large or small. Large and
small are entirely relative terms.47
Anaxagoras' theory of infinite divisibility— "of the
small there is no least but always a lesser" (B 3)— is then
a deduction from three propositions in his response to Par
menides:
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(1) There is no coming-to-be or perishing.
(2) Nevertheless, a thing perceived as A can change
into a thing perceived as B.
(3) This is possible only if B is latent in A.
There is no reason to think that he was unable to work this
out without a nudge from Zeno. On the contrary, if he did
work it out after reading Zeno, then he either stupidly mis
understood or shamelessly ignored Zeno’s whole point. For
Zeno introduced the infinite divisibility of "what is" only
to show that it leads to ridiculous and unacceptable conse
quences. If it is infinitely divisible into an infinite
number of ultimate units, then it is impossible to give a
non-contradictory account of these units (B 1-2). If it is
infinitely divisible without any ultimate units, then you
can never traverse it or give any non-contradictory account
of its limits (the Dichotomy and the Achilles).48 The Atomists and Aristotle tried to deal with this powerful attack
on divisibility; not Anaxagoras.
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Anaxagoras’ Theory of Change -- Notes

Anaxagoras B 17. This seems an appropriate moment
to defend the fragments of Anaxagoras quoted by Simplicius
from the attack on their authenticity in the book by Gershen
son and Greenberg.
(Full references for all the modern lit
erature cited are given in the Bibliography, pp.
).
These authors conclude that "the quotations from
Anaxagoras to be found in Simplicius' commentaries . . . are
useless as sources from which to reconstruct Anaxagoras'
thought" (p. 358) on four grounds:
a) "The same 'quotations' appear differently in different
places." But this is also true of Simplicius' quotations from
Plato's Timaeus, which he certainly knew well. For example,
Trn 51 e 6-52 d 1 is quoted by Simplicius in Ph. 224.30ff
(call this A) and 539.14ff (B), with the following differences
(according to Diels' apparatus and text):
52 a 2
a
b
c
c
c
c
c

8
1
1
2
4
6
7

οΰτε cÆrro εΊσδεχομενον α: οΰτε lv.1. aíra¡j
ε’ις aοτο είσδεχδμ,ενον b
αυ A; οώτδ .B
,γενέσθαι A: γενεοχν, Bεγερθέντες A: διεγερθεντες B
λέγειν A: ε'ιπείν B
τι
B
t vîεως
it A:αν
St om.
ως
τι
ως εάν τι B
ποτέ kl om. B

Some of this text is quoted elsewhere by Simplicius, with
different variations (e.g. 43.15ff omits άλλβθεν in 52 a 3).
With all these variations, Simplicius preserves the sense
perfectly; so why not also in the case of Anaxagoras?
b) "It is often impossible to tell where the ''quotations’
begin or end" (p. 360). Agreed; but it is often reasonable
to believe that one is right in the middle.
c) "The quotations are full of interpolations" (p. 363). This
assertion is based only on the fact that Simplicius often in
terpolates remarks of his own in citations from Aristotle, for
which we have a control, and on Gershenson's and Greenberg's
disapproval of the content of some clauses in what Simplicius
attributes to Anaxagoras.
d) "Simplicius did not have Anaxagoras* book" (p. 370). The
case on this ground is very flimsy; one could make as strong
a case against Simplicius’ quotations from Empedocles. G.
Strohmaier in CMG Suppl. Or. Ill (1970) p. 90, argues that
Galen had a copy of Anaxagoras’ book (I owe this reference to
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Mr. Vivian Nutton).
Simplicius claims confidently (Ph.
166.16) that he has οώτηήλέξις
of Anaxagoras.
Of course we must always be cautious in accepting
any alleged quotation as a genuine fragment of any Presocratic
philosopher. We are always dealing with what is relatively
reliable at best. In my view (and nearly everyone else's),
Simplicius is a relatively reliable source for Anaxagoras.
2Empedocles B 9, from Plutarch adv. Coloten. The text
is uncertain in three places. In the last line, the negative
is a supplement, to correct the metre, suggested by Wyttenbach and adopted by most subsequent editors. If it is wrong,
the line means; "But they are right to call them so [sc. pro
vided that they understand what they are doing], and I myself
comply . . . "
3

Aristotle Ph. 187 a 26 says Anaxagoras accepted the
common opinion of the physikoi that nothing comes to be from
nothing.
Simplicius in his commentary (162.11ff) notes that
Parmenides presented the arguments for this position, and
goes straight on to say (162.26) "Anaxagoras accepted this as
an axiom." He proceeds at once to give his outline of Anax
agoras' philosophy as an attempt to account for perceptible
change while accepting this axiom.
Recently Professor Martin L. West has published a dis
senting opinion (EGP&O p 219) : "Why must we suppose that they
[sc. Empedocles and Anaxagoras] are seeking an alternative
answer to 'the problem posed by Parmenides'?" However, Mr.
West's analysis of Parmenides, which follows, is so frivolous
that it would be surprising if he thought anyone needed to
compose an answer.
^For this reading of the line, see my "Notes on Par
menides", pp. 5-6.
5Ás Professor West puts it (p. 232), "we also find
Zeno playing around with infinite divisibility." The argu
ments connecting Anaxagoras' position with Zeno, to which Mr.
West airily alludes, are set out by Gigott, Raven and Calogero,
among others.
®0n these words, see Guthrie's note, HGPh II 325-6.
^Note Shorey's argument (CPhilol 1922, 350) that Plato
Protag. 329 d-e tells against the use of any such term by
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Anaxagoras himself.
89-90.

See also Mathewson, and Strohmaier

pp.

8Ph♦ III 4, 203 a 19; Metaph. I 3, 984 a 11; De cáelo
III 3, 302 a 28; GÇ I 1, 314 a 18.
^The last reference in the preceding note.
■^See the list in Meteor. 388 a 13-20.
^ S o Guthrie II 326, and others.
•^So Kerferd, in Mourelatos Pre-S p

498, and others.

13 B 10. The actual words are, I think, less well
authenticated than the Simplicius fragments, but the accuracy
of the content is amply confirmed.
14 Lucretius I 835-40. Lucretius, who is opposing the
theory, spoils it by using bones (ossa), viscera and earths
(terrae) as count nouns instead of mass nouns.
■'■■’Aetius I 3 5 = DK 59 A 46. Compare Theophrastus,
cited by Simplicius PJb. 27.11 (in DK 59 A 41). Aetius differs
from Lucretius in using homoiomeria to mean a part that is
like that of which it is a component, whereas Lucretius uses
it to refer to the principle that there are such parts.
Ί C

°According to Cornford (A & F II, p. 316 n9), it is
the "irresponsible conjecture of a doxographer."
"^Bread, Aetius* example, is a bad one, because it
is an artificial substance, and as such it is doubtful whether
it would be included in Anaxagoras* elements. Substitute
"flour".
18 This may be an appropriate occasion to pay tribute
to the late Arthur L. Peck, who did excellent work on Anax
agoras which is perhaps not as well known as it should be.
His distinction between Aristotle's use of homoiomeres and
the doctrine of Anaxagoras to which the name homoiomereia was
attached is very close to mine: "The portions in anything
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you care to choose are similar to the portions in any other
thing, for there is a portion or part of everything in them
all. What could be a more exact name for this doctrine than
Homoiomereia. the similarity of parts, or, as Lucretius puts
it, rerum homoeomeria? This has the advantage not only of
fitting the doctrine exactly, but of being a clear echo of
the famous phrase
iv παντι παντός μοίρα £νεστι
" (CQ XXV 1931,
p. 118). The difference is that Mr. Peck refers to the
similarity of parts of different things, whereas I think the
Aristotelian usage of the term homoiomeres probably led the
doxographers to use cognate terms to refer to parts of the
same thing.
Cyril Bailey (G_k. Atomists, p. 551) gets the essential
point right--that homoiomereity of the Aristotelian type can
not help in an explanation of physical change— but his account
of the theory is spoilt, in my view, by his interpretation of
the "seeds" of fr. 4 as particles. It is important to realise
that particles play no part in Anaxagoras' theory (Lanza's
1963 article is good on this point): with some justice, he
makes of it a general criticism of the "studiosi anglosassoni").
Charles Mugler may also be right in his account of the
concept of homoiomereity as applied to Anaxagoras (pp. 358-63
of the article cited in the bibliography), but his exposition
leaves so many questions unanswered that I cannot be sure. I
do feel sure, however, that much of the rest of his article
is wrong— particularly his claim that Anaxagoras' prime target
was Leucippus.
use the expression "break down into parts" delib
erately as a cover-all. Gregory Vlastos makes use of a dis
tinction very similar to mine (though more complicated, be
cause of his theory of "powers" and "seeds"), but expresses
it by distinguishing "division" from some other process of
rearrangement (A & F II, pp. 338-39). But there is no evi
dence and no a priori reason, so far as I can see, why divi
sion, as well as rearrangement, should not result--at some
stage, sometimes— in parts with different ingredients pre
dominating. There is some evidence for this: at the end of
B 12, Anaxagoras writes: "Mind is all alike, both the greater
and the smaller." This implies that in other things the
greater and the smaller are not all alike. The next sentence
appears to say as much (or even more):
ετερον δε obôev
'εστιν δμοιον οίιδενί.
(I owe this point to Mr. Malcolm Schofield.)
20

Anaxagoras in the fragments says only that the pre
ponderant ingredients determine what the thing is "most evi
dently". The Derveni papyrus, which recalls many Anaxagorean
ideas, says "each thing jLs called from what predominates."
(See Burkert, Ejt. Philos. , p. 445.)
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Mr. Colin Strang makes an essential point (A & F II,
p. 361ff) in his distinction between "common and elemental
substance". A piece of what is commonly called "gold" is so
called because it has a predominance of pure, elemental gold
in it. This is just plain common sense. When I drink a
glass of water in Princeton, I still call it "water" (even if
reluctantly), although it contains heaven knows what other
ingredients. What is peculiar about Anaxagoras is that he
denies that any pure substance (except Mind) can be wholly
isolated from any other. It is sometimes said that this gives
rise to an epistemological problem (what jLs water, if it
never exists in a pure state?). If so, we should have to say
that no non-chemist knows what he is talking about when he
asks for a glass of water.
^ I n Mourelatos Pre-S, p. 498.
22

See especially Peck and Mathewson.

23A

& F II,

p.

272.

^ D e cáelo III 4, 302 b 25. It is worth noticing that
this observation might be used, if we like, to turn the usual
account of the history upside down. For example, Vlastos
writes (in A & F II, p. 327): "No Ionian had ever said that
earth had been 'in' the original matrix. Empedocles had said
just that, precisely because he had endowed earth with Parmenidean being. Anaxagoras takes a long step in the same
direction. He holds that earth, air, aether, as well as hair,
flesh and every other substance are 'in' the primitive mix
ture, for they all have Parmenidean being." Could we not put
it this way instead? Anaxagoras saved mortal men from Par
menidean non-being by making their components and their seeds
into entities with Parmenidean being. But Empedocles went
much further in the same direction, by claiming that these
extravagantly varied Parmenidean beings could be reduced to
just four? And the Atomists further still, by cutting out
irreducible qualitative differences altogether? Is there any
thing in this line of thought?
I put this point in the form of a question, because I
am not sure whether Empedocles wrote before Anaxagoras or
vice versa, and whether either of them knew the work of the
other at the time of writing. For an extensive discussion of
the arguments, see O ’Brien's 1968 article; he concludes that
Empedocles wrote later than Anaxagoras, and was influenced by
him. F. Solmsen now writes: "Reasons that have been communi
cated to me but are not yet in the public domain have streng
thened my inclination to regard Anaxagoras as later than
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Empedocles" (AGPh 1975, p, 123 n2). It will be interesting
to learn more about this important leak.
25 For the interpretation of this fragment, see espe
cially Hermann Frankel, WuF 284ff., and Gregory Vlastos in
A & F II, 354-60.
DK prints consecutively as fr. 4 twenty lines that
are never quoted consecutively by Simplicius. At PJh. 156.2ff.,
he quotes the first three lines, followed by the second para
graph; but this second paragraph is introduced by "φησί "--a
hint that a new quotation is beginning. Taken as a whole,
the evidence suggests that what DK prints as two paragraphs
of fr. 4 is really two separate fragments; so following
Frankel, Lanza and others, I call them 4a and 4b.
(Frankel
actually divides 4b into two as well.)
Frankel interprets the whole of 4a as in the condi
tional mood. He first explains the omission of αν with the
infinitives συμπαγηναι etc. as perhaps "ein Archaismus von
Anaxagoras’ Sprache" (p. 280). G. E. L. Owen is quoted as
objecting to this interpretation (see A & F II, 360 nl7, and
379 n28) that it cannot survive the indicative χρωνται in DK
II 34.14. But, as Frankel himself seems to suggest (p. 281),
his interpretation does not depend on the infinitives being
potential. The whole construction is dependent on the opening
phrase:
τούτων ούτως £χδντων, χρή δοκεΤν
. The general sense
is this: granted that the initial conditions are as we have
described them, it is right to suppose (i.e. it is only what
one would have expected) that . . . "men were composed . . .
and there are cities built by the men . . . just as we see
around us ( ώσπερ παρ'ήμ'ΐν )." The potential optative in the
last sentence follows quite naturally: given the initial
conditions, the same would happen anywhere. There is no
commitment to "other worlds" here.
0

f

"There is no satisfactory explanation of the mention
of earth in this connection, unless earth were one variety of
seed" (Vlastos, in A & F II, 343 nl7). . It may be that earth
is mentioned because of its connection with the growth of
seeds. That is its role in B 4a (line 12 in DK).
27

Vlastos in A & F II, 342 n7 points out that
need not mean "shape", but may mean "form" in a quite general
sense. True; on the other hand, Empedocles' use of the word,
which Vlastos claims to be equally general, in the expression
παντοίαις ίδέησιν έψηρβτα, θαύμα ’ιδεσθαι
(Β 35.17) is precisely to refer to the properties of complex
organisms.
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^®See Vlastos in A & F II, 324-25, with the references
to biological texts in his note 20.
29Pe cáelo III 3, 302 a 28ff (DK A 43), Simplicius
603.7ff (not in DK) and Theophrastus HP III 1, 4 (DK A 117).
There are some other passages, quoted by Lanza, Anassagora,
A 111, A 113, A 117. Censorinus 6.6 and 6.8 (A 111) has a
note about the role of animal seed in bringing about resem
blances between parents and children. Theophrastus De causis
plantarum 1 5 , 2 and Varro De re rustica I 40, 1 (both in
A 117) report on seeds of plants carried imperceptibly in air
or water. Irenaeus II 14, 2 (A 113) extends this idea to
animal seed.
Perhaps a mite of confirmation for my interpretation
may be found here: what was worth remembering about Anaxag
oras was that he held a theory according to which the seeds
of plants and animals are latent in air and water.
(I am
grateful to Mr. David Sider for drawing ray attention to these
passages.)
^®See above, n. 25.
3-*-The ambiguity of this word is of course deliberate.
32

Not the same as potency, although it may be a fore
bear of it.
^2In spite of Calogero's argument that πλήθος may
mean no more than "amount" or "quantity" (Storia p. 257), I
think it means number here.
^This is not inconsistent with the reports that
Anaxagoras spoke about" the origin of living forms (Diogenes
Laertius 2.9, Hippol. I 8, 12). They originated in the same
sense as every other feature of the cosmos--by "separating
out" of the original mixture.
•*~*De cáelo III 3, 302 a 28ff = DK A 43, quoted above.
For an explanation of the mistake, see Vlastos in A & F II,
339-40.
^Because the evidence is such that however meticu
lously one examines it, it will never make a conclusive case.
Perhaps the simplest argument is this: Anaxagoras wrote the
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first prose treatise (Diogenes Laertius II 11); Zeno wrote in
prose; therefore, Zeno wrote after Anaxagoras. Unfortunately,
both the meaning and the truth of Diogenes' statement are un
certain.
37Parmenides 127 a~c.
38DK A 1-3.
39HGPh II 266.
40HGPh II 303.
AX

ae wrote only one (Diogenes Laertius II 6) but
apparently it filled more than one roll, since Simplicius
refers to "the first of his Physica" (Ph. 155.26 and 163.19).
^ S e e Davidson.
See especially Raven in C() 1954 and in KR, p. 370-71,
Guthrie HGPh II 289ff., Calogero Storia 256ff. For a re
buttal, see Strang in A & F II, 366-67.
^This was pointed out by Strang, A & F II, 377 nl3.
^3But it is not necessary to think that Zeno had
Anaxagoras in mind as a specific target. He was systemati
cally looking for contradictions to be derived from "there are
many", and it is not necessary to think that all the types of
pluralism that he attacked were actually asserted by anyone.
4 6
On this, see Strang, A &

F II, 366-67.

^This conclusion is the same as Calogero's (Storia
pp. 261ff) but I differ from him about many details.
^®For this interpretation of Zeno, see G. E. L. Owen,
in A & F II, ch. V, and my Two Studies, pp. 69-70, reprinted
in Mourelatos PreS, pp. 360-61.
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